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Introduction
The recent financial crisis has highlighted the importance of one of the main com-
ponents of the financial risk: the credit risk. Of particular interest in finance has
become the modeling of credit risk for measuring portfolio risk and for pricing
securities exposed to credit risk, as defaultable bonds and credit derivatives.
In this thesis we focus on modeling the aggregated risk of a portfolio, and
on studying the relationship between default risk and yield rates for defaultable
bonds. In particular we analyze financial indicators of the default risk of a portfolio
of credit risky assets and of a bond.
This first chapter aims at contributing to the literature on the pricing of port-
folios of credit derivatives (such as CDOs or basket CDS) where the goal is to
compute the joint probability of default of a portfolio of risky assets. In this re-
gard, the risk of default of each asset in the portfolio depends on mostly two sources
of randomness: an individual risk factor and a common market factor. The lat-
ter represents the uncertainty affecting all assets simultaneously. Our scope is to
model the aggregate portfolio risk. Such main theme is fundamental in finance
both for the valuation of many credit derivatives and for extracting information
from market prices that can be relevant from a macro-prudential point of view
(such as estimating joint probabilities of default or probabilities of default condi-
tional on other assets being in default). The recent international financial crisis
has just highlighted the missing of correct models for valuating credit derivatives
as CDO. From the theoretical point of view we develop a dynamic multivariate
default model. A recent paper of Mai and Scherer (2008) uses a stochastic time
change to introduce dependence in a portfolio of credit risky assets. In that paper
the default times are modeled as random variables with possibly different marginal
distribution. By restricting the time change to suitable Le´vy subordinators the
authors can separate the dependence structure and the marginal default proba-
bilities. Using a so-called time normalization they compute the survival copula of
all default times. In order to compute the portfolio loss distribution and to apply
their model to the pricing of CDO tranches, an homogeneous portfolio is assumed,
in which all default times share the same marginal distribution. Our model de-
velops the ideas of Mai and Scherer (2008) by introducing the case of different
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marginal distributions for the different assets in the portfolio; we aim at introduc-
ing heterogeneity in the model by allowing for an heterogeneous portfolio, as in
the implied copula model of Hull and White (2009). In particular we define and
model a cumulative dynamic hazard process as a Le´vy subordinator, which allows
for jumps and induces positive probabilities of joint defaults, and we model the de-
pendence structure by the implied survival copula, which is related to the choice of
the subordinator. In our model we allow the main asset classes in the portfolio to
have different cumulative default probabilities and corresponding different cumu-
lative hazard processes. We find an analytical closed formula for the distribution
of the portfolio-loss process under this heterogeneous assumption, and we prove
an approximation formula for the loss distribution that is useful for empirical ap-
plications. Once we have specified a suitable Le´vy subordinator, our model can be
calibrated to portfolio-CDS spreads and CDO tranche spreads, properly choosing
the model parameters that determine the dependence structure. Once we have
developed the model for the heterogeneous case we may use it to determine the
possible testable implications that our theoretical model for the dependence of the
joint defaults has for the characteristics of the CDS prices. From an empirical
point of view we calibrate the parameters of our model to the tranches of the
iTraxx Europe, which is a basket of 125 CDS on the European firms. Once we
have estimated the multivariate default distribution of the companies included in
the iTraxx we can follow Segoviano and Goodhart (2010) and analyze the distress
dependence in the portfolio computing indicators of systemic risk by estimating a
set of stability measures that incorporate changes in distress dependence that are
consistent with the economic cycle. Examples of these stability measures are the
Stability Index (that reflects the expected number of firms becoming distressed
given that at least one firm has become distressed), the Distress Dependence Ma-
trix (in which we estimate the set of pairwise conditional probabilities of distress
providing some insights into inter-linkages and likelihood of contagion between the
firms), and the Probability of Cascade Effects (that characterizes the likelihood
that one or more institutions becomes distressed given that a specific firm becomes
distressed). These stability measures can be used to verify which firms are more
systemically relevant for the index as a whole.
In the second chapter we study the relationship between the risk of default
and the yield-to-maturity of a bond. Credit Default Swap (CDS) spreads and
bond spreads (i.e. the spreads between the bond yield rate and the risk free
rate) have become commonly used as default risk indicators for risk analysis (see
for example Bank of England, 2009, and Fitch, 2010a, 2010b). However, both
CDS and bond spreads depend not only on variables directly linked to the risk
of default but also on the specific structure of the contract. In particular, in
this chapter we show that bond spreads can be misleading if used to infer the
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default probability of the issuers, and consequently the yield-to-maturity must
be cautiously interpreted as an indicator of the bond default risk.1 In fact, the
yield rate, for given default probabilities and recovery rates, can considerably
vary as a function of the residual life and the coupon value of the bond. In
particular, when there is default risk, bonds with high coupons are more likely
to have high yield rates too (and viceversa). The intuition behind this result is
that greater coupons are associated with less than proportional price increases,
because there is a probability, linked to the default likelyhood, that the coupons
are not actually payed-off. Bond prices which are relatively low with respect to the
nominal payment flows (on which the yield is computed) determine nominal yields
which are relatively higher. This implies that bonds with higher default risk can
have lower yields (and viceversa), just as a consequence of their coupon structures.
Also the slope of the yield curve must be cautiously interpreted as in general it
does not convey enough information to establish if the default risk is higher in
one period than in another period. We show that a downward sloping yield curve
does not necessarily imply that the default probability on shorter maturities is
higher than on longer maturities. This result arises from the fact that also the
yield curve slope is linked to the coupon rate: taking fixed the other variables (in
particular the default probability and the recovery rate) bonds with low coupons
determine decreasing yield curves, while bonds with high coupons imply increasing
yield curves. The intuition behind this result is that higher coupons determine
losses relatively higher for bonds with longer maturity in case of default, and
consequently higher yields for these bonds. On the contrary, when the coupons
are low, the nominal losses in case of default are similar both for short term
and long term bonds;2 it follows that the prices of longer maturity bonds, for
which the losses are likely in far away time horizons, are relatively higher, and the
corresponding yields are lower. Most of the literature available on the valuation
of fixed income securities (see for example Fabozzi, 2003, 2007), is focused on the
interest rate risk (i.e. the bond’s price sensitivity to the change in interest rates)
and the concept of duration is used to describe the relationship between the bond
maturity and coupon rate, and the bond price sensitivity (a longer maturity and a
lower coupon rate are linked to a greater price sensitivity to interest rate changes);
in this context a higher bond yield is considered as a premium for the higher
interest rate risk. In this chapter we study similar financial indicators that could
be used in presence of credit (or default) risk to properly evaluate the relationship
1In particular, without loss of generality, we assume that the risk-free rate is constant in the
considered time horizon, so that the yield level provides information analogous to the spread
between the yield rate and the risk-free rate. Anyway the inferred considerations are still valid,
on a quality level, even in case the risk-free rate curve is not flat.
2For the zero-coupon bonds, for example, in case of default the loss is always only given by
the amount lost on the bond final pay-off.
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between the defaultable bond yield and its default probability.
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Chapter 1
A Dynamic Default Dependence
Model
1.1 Introduction
This paper aims at contributing to the literature on the pricing of portfolios of
credit derivatives (such as CDOs or basket CDS) where the goal is to compute the
joint probability of default of a portfolio of risky assets. In this regard, the risk of
default of each asset in the portfolio depends on mostly two sources of randomness:
an individual risk factor and a common market factor. The latter represents the
uncertainty affecting all assets simultaneously. Our scope is to model the aggregate
portfolio risk. Such main theme is fundamental in finance both for the valuation
of many credit derivatives and for extracting information from market prices that
can be relevant from a macro-prudential point of view (such as estimating joint
probabilities of default or probabilities of default conditional on other assets being
in default). The recent international financial crisis has just highlighted the missing
of correct models for valuating credit derivatives as CDO.
From the theoretical point of view we want to develop a dynamic multivari-
ate default model. A recent paper of Mai and Scherer (2008) uses a stochastic
time change to introduce dependence in a portfolio of credit risky assets. In that
paper the default times are modelled as random variables with possibly different
marginal distribution. By restricting the time change to suitable Le´vy subordina-
tors the authors can separate the dependence structure and the marginal default
probabilities. Using a so-called time normalization they compute the survival cop-
ula of all default times. In order to compute the portfolio loss distribution and
to apply their model to the pricing of CDO tranches, an homogeneous portfolio
is assumed, in which all default times share the same marginal distribution. Our
model develops the ideas of Mai and Scherer (2008) by introducing the case of
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different marginal distributions for the different assets in the portfolio; we aim at
introducing heterogeneity in the model by allowing for an heterogeneous portfo-
lio, as in the implied copula model of Hull and White (2009). In particular we
define and model a cumulative dynamic hazard process as a Le´vy subordinator,
which allows for jumps and induces positive probabilities of joint defaults, and we
model the dependence structure by the implied survival copula, which is related
to the choice of the subordinator. In our model we allow the main asset classes in
the portfolio to have different cumulative default probabilities and corresponding
different cumulative hazard processes. We find an analytical closed formula for
the distribution of the portfolio-loss process under this heterogeneous assumption,
and we prove an approximation formula for the loss distribution that is useful for
empirical applications.
Once we have specified a suitable Le´vy subordinator, our model can be cali-
brated to portfolio-CDS spreads and CDO tranche spreads, properly choosing the
model parameters that determine the dependence structure. Once we have devel-
oped the model for the heterogeneous case we may use it to determine the possible
testable implications that our theoretical model for the dependence of the joint
defaults has for the characteristics of the CDS prices.
From an empirical point of view we calibrate the parameters of our model to
the tranches of the iTraxx Europe, which is a basket of 125 CDS on the European
firms. Once we have estimated the multivariate default distribution of the com-
panies included in the iTraxx we can follow Segoviano and Goodhart (2010) and
analyze the distress dependence in the portfolio computing indicators of systemic
risk by estimating a set of stability measures that incorporate changes in distress
dependence that are consistent with the economic cycle. Examples of these stabil-
ity measures are 1) the Stability Index, that reflects the expected number of firms
becoming distressed given that at least one firm has become distressed; 2) the
Distress Dependence Matrix, in which we estimate the set of pairwise conditional
probabilities of distress providing some insights into inter-linkages and likelihood
of contagion between the firms; 3) the Probability of Cascade Effects that charac-
terizes the likelihood that one or more institutions becomes distressed given that
a specific firm becomes distressed. These stability measures can be used to verify
which firms are more systemically relevant for the index as a whole.
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1.2 Credit Derivatives
A credit derivative is a derivative security that is primarily used to transfer, hedge
or manage credit risk. The credit derivative payoff is conditioned on the occurrence
of a credit event. The credit event is defined with respect to a reference credit (or
several reference credits), and the reference credit asset(s) issued by the reference
credit. If the credit event has occurred, the default payment has to be made
by one of the counterparties. A credit event is a precisely defined default event,
such as bankruptcy, failure to pay, obligation default, repudiation/moratorium,
ratings downgrade below a given threshold, changes in the credit spread. A default
payment is the payment which has to be made if a credit event has happened.
1.2.1 Credit Default Swap
In a single-name credit default swap (CDS) the default seller B agrees to pay the
default payment to the default buyer A if a default has happened. The default
payment is structured to replace the loss that a typical lender would incur upon a
credit event of the reference entity. If there is no default of the reference security
until the maturity of the default swap, counterparty B pays nothing. On the other
side the default buyer A pays a fee for the default protection. In the most common
version the fee is payd at regular intervals until default or maturity. If a default
occurs between two fee payment dates, A still has to pay the fraction of the next
fee payment that has accrued until the time of default.
1.2.2 Portfolio Credit Derivatives and CDOs
When dealing with a portfolio, we must consider the risk of a clustering of defaults
and of joint defaults. Basket and portfolio credit derivatives are instruments used
to manage risks of this type.
Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDOs) are financial products to securitise
portfolios of defaultable assets: loans, bonds or credit default swaps. The as-
sets are sold to a specific company and investors are offered the opportunity to
invest in notes issued by this company. These obligations are collateralized by
the underlying debt portfolio. The different notes are structured in order to offer
risk/return profiles that are specifically targeted to the risk appetite and invest-
ment restrictions of different investors groups. A simple CDO has the following
components:
• The underlying portfolio is composed of defaultable assets issued by issuers
Ci with notional amounts Ki, i = 1, ..., I. The total notional is K =
∑I
i=1Ki.
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• The portfolio is transferred into a special created company, the special pur-
pose vehicle (SPV).
• The SPV issues notes:
an equity (or first-loss) tranche with notional KE;
several mezzanine tranches with notional KM1 , KM2 , KM3 , etc.;
a senior tranche with notional KS.
• If during the existence of the CDO one of the bonds in the portfolio defaults,
the recovery payments are reinvested in default-free securities.
• At maturity of the CDO, the portfolio is liquidated and the proceeds are
distributed to the tranches, according to their seniority ranking.
The key point of the CDO is the final redistribution of the portfolio value
according to the seniority of the notes. First, the senior tranche is served. If the
senior tranche can be fully repaid, the most senior mezzanine tranche is repaid.
If this tranche can also be fully repaid, then the next tranches are paid off in the
order of their seniority, until finally the equity tranche is paid whatever is left of
the portfolio’s value. The payoffs are function of the losses.
1. The first losses hit the equity tranche alone. Until the cumulative loss amount
has reached the equity’s notional KE, the other tranches are protected by
the equity tranche.
2. Cumulative losses exceeding KE affect the first mezzanine tranche, until its
notional is used up.
3. After this, the subsequent mezzanine tranches are hit in the order of their
seniority.
4. Only when all other tranches have absorbed their share of the losses will the
senior tranche suffer any losses.
In the standard CDOs the underlying portfolio can consist of bonds (collater-
alized bond obligation, or CBO) or loans (collateralized loan obligation, or CLO).
We have instead a synthetic CDO when credit default swaps are used instead
of bonds or loans in the underlying portfolio.
Basically, once a CDO is constructed by partitioning the credit portfolio in
tranches with different seniority, a tranche represents a certain loss piece of the
overall portfolio which is defined by its lower and upper attachment points. The
protection seller receives periodic premium payments depending on the remaining
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nominal and the spread of this tranche, while the protection buyer is compensated
for losses affecting this tranche. Pricing of a tranche corresponds to assessing the
spread such that the expected discounted payment streams of this tranche agree.
1.3 Mathematical Preliminaries
1.3.1 Le´vy subordinator
Let (Ω,F ,P) be a probability space. A one-dimensional Le´vy process on this prob-
ability space is a ca`dla`g stochastic process Λ = {Λt}t≥0 starting at Λ0 = 0, which
is stochastically continuous and has independent and stationary increments. A
Le´vy subordinator is a particular Le´vy process in which almost all paths are non-
decreasing. A Le´vy subordinator is completely characterized by two characteris-
tics: a drift µ ≥ 0 and a positive measure ν on (0,∞). Basically Λ is a process
that grows linearly with a constant drift and is affected by random upward jumps.
The process drift is µ ≥ 0, while the expected number of jumps greater than or
equal to x within a unit of time is given by the Le´vy measure ν of the interval
[x,∞). In particular, if Λt is a Le´vy subordinator with related Le´vy measure ν,
then there exists µ ≥ 0 such that
Ψ(λ) = µλ+
∫ ∞
0
(eλ t − 1) ν(dt), λ ≤ 0, t ≥ 0.
Remark that the function Ψ is with negative values, Ψ(0) = 0 and, unless
Λt ≡ 0, is strictly increasing. The function Ψ is the Laplace exponent of Λ that
completely determines the process via its Laplace transform
E
(
eλΛt
)
= etΨ(λ).
Three fundamental examples of Le´vy subordinators, that we will use in this
paper, are the following Le´vy processes:
• the Inverse Gaussian Subordinator ;
• the Gamma Subordinator ;
• the Compound Poisson Subordinator.
The Inverse Gaussian Subordinator
The Inverse Gaussian (IG) subordinator ΛIG = {ΛIGt }t≥0 belongs to the class of
infinite activity subordinators, meaning that processes of this class jump infinitely
often within a unit interval of time. The IG Le´vy measure as well as the density of
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the underlying infinitely divisible distribution are well known. In particular, given
an IG subordinator with parameters η, β > 0, we have that ΛIGt follows an Inverse
Gaussian IG(βt, η)-distribution with density
fIG(x) =
βt√
2pi
x−
3
2 eηβte−
1
2
(
β2t2
x
+η2x
)
1{x>0}.
The corresponding Le´vy measure is given by
νIG(dx) =
1√
2pi
βx−
3
2 e−
1
2
η2x1{x>0}dx.
The Gamma Subordinator
The Gamma (Γ) subordinator ΛΓ = {ΛΓt }t≥0 is another Le´vy process that belongs
to the class of infinite activity subordinators. Given a Gamma subordinator with
parameters η, β > 0, we have that ΛΓy follows a Gamma Γ(βt, η)-distribution with
density
fΓ(x) =
ηβt
Γ(βt)
xβt−1e−xη1{x>0},
where
Γ(y) =
∫ ∞
0
ty−1e−tdt.
The corresponding Le´vy measure is given by
νΓ(dx) = βe
−ηx 1
x
1{x>0}dx.
The Compound Poisson Subordinator
The Compound Poisson subordinator is of the form
Λt = µt+
Nt∑
k=1
Jk,
where {Jk}k∈N are i.i.d. random variables with a cumulative distribution D with
support on the positive axis, and N = {Nt}t≥0 is a Poisson process with intensity
β which is independent of {Jk}k∈N. The Le´vy measure corresponding to this Le´vy
subordinator has the form νP (dy) = βdD(y). This subordinator has upward jumps
of magnitude Jk and the expected number of jumps within a unit time interval is β.
For instance we can assume that D is the exponential distribution with parameter
η > 0, so that we get a subordinator depending on the only two parameters η and
β.
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1.3.2 Time normalization condition
In the model of Mai and Scherer [3] the following time normalization condition
is needed to be able to separate the marginal distributions and the dependence
structure, given by a copula that, under such condition, doesn’t depend on the
marginal distributions.
Definition 1 (Time normalization (TN)).). Let F be a cumulative distribution
function with F (0) = 0. Let Λ = {Λt}t≥0 be a stochastic process which is almost
surely non-decreasing and such that Λ0 = 0. We say that Λ satisfies (TN) for the
distribution F if E
[
F (Λt)
]
= F (t), for each t ≥ 0.
If in particular we consider the cumulative distribution function of an expo-
nential random variable with parameter (−λ) > 0, F (t) = (1 − eλt)1{t>0}, and a
Le´vy subordinator Λ with characteristics (µ, ν), we have that
Λ satisfies (TN) forF ⇔ Ψ(λ) = λ
.
1.4 The Multivariate Default Model
The model developed in this paper is an extension of the Mai and Scherer model
[3].
Consider n defaultable firms with default times
τ1, τ2, . . . , τn.
In [3] these default times are supposed to be characterized by individual factors,
given by their marginal distribution functions Gi(t) (with Gi(0) = 0, Gi(t) < 1 for
each t ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , n), and linked by a common factor, a Le´vy subordinator Λt
with Laplace exponent Ψ(λ). In particular for each firm is considered, by a time
transformation, the related cumulative hazard function hi(t) = − log(1 − Gi(t));
this function hi(t) : [0,∞) → R is non negative, increasing, with hi(0) = 0 and
such that limt→∞ hi(t) =∞. The firms survival functions are so defined as Gi(t) :=
e−hi(t), t ≥ 0.
In order to construct the default times such that they have the pre-specified
marginal distributions and the dependence structure given by the subordinator, as
threshold factors are considered n exponential times Ei, i.i.d. exponential random
variables with parameter 1, also independent by the Le´vy subordinator (Λt)t≥0
satisfying (TN) for the unit exponential law, and so with Laplace exponent Ψ
satisfying Ψ(−1) = −1. In [3] the i-th default time is defined by
τi = inf{t > 0 : Λhi(t) > Ei},
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and so can be considered as first-jump time of a Poisson process with the stochastic
clock {Λhi(t)}t≥0.
In our paper we consider the existence of other individual factors that, together
with the individual hazard function and the common subordinator, define the
default times as
τi = inf{t > 0 : ai Λhi(t) + bi hi(t) > Ei}.
In other words, for each i = 1, . . . n, there exists a Le´vy subordinator
Λi(t) = ai Λt + bi t
and a function hi such that
τi = inf{t > 0 : Λi(hi(t)) > Ei}.
Working with the survival distributions, let us first compute the marginal dis-
tributions and in a second step the joint distribution.
The marginal distributions
For each default time the marginal survival distribution is given by
F i(t) := P(τi > t) = E
(
P(τi > t|FΛ∞)
)
= E
(
e−Λi(hi(t))
)
= E
(
e−aiΛhi(t)−bi hi(t)
)
= eΨ(−ai)hi(t)−bi hi(t) = e−(bi−Ψ(−ai))hi(t) =
(
Gi(t)
)bi−Ψ(−ai)
Let us observe that assuming the parameters constraint bi − Ψ(−ai) = 1, we
would obtain that the default times marginal distributions are in fact Gi(t).
We can also obtain the inverse function
F
−1
i (u) = t(u) ⇔ e−(bi−Ψ(−ai))hi(t(u)) = u ⇔ −(bi−Ψ(−ai))hi(t(u)) = log u
m
hi(t(u)) = − log u
bi −Ψ(−ai) (∗)
that means, as hi is strictly increasing and continuous, and so invertible,
F
−1
i (u) = h
−1
i
(− log u
bi −Ψ(−ai)
)
.
Notice that (∗) will be fundamental to compute the survival joint copula, as we’ll
see later.
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The joint distribution
For the joint survival distribution, conditioning to the sigma-algebra FΛ∞, we get
F τ1,...,τn(t1, . . . , tn) := P(τi > ti, i = 1, . . . , n) = E
(
P(τi > ti, i = 1, . . . , n|FΛ∞)
)
= E
( n∏
i=1
e−Λi(hi(ti))
)
= E
( n∏
i=1
e−aiΛhi(ti)−bi hi(ti)
)
= E
( n∏
i=1
e−aiΛhi(ti)
)
e−
∑n
i=1 bi hi(ti).
To compute the expected value
E
( n∏
i=1
e−aiΛhi(ti)
)
= E
(
e−
∑n
i=1 aiΛhi(ti)
)
we introduce the permutation σi(t) = σi(t1, . . . , tn) such that
h(i)(t) := hσi(t)(tσi(t))
is a reordering of hi(ti), that means that
h(i−1)(t) ≤ h(i)(t), i = 1, . . . n,
where we assume by convention h(0)(t) = 0.
Let us also introduce the following notation:
θj(t) =
n∑
i=j
aσi(t), j = 1, . . . n
so that
θj+1(t) = θj(t)− aσj(t), j = 1, . . . n
where we assume by convention that θn+1(t) = 0.
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We have
n∑
i=1
aiΛhi(ti) =
n∑
i=1
aσi(t) Λhσi(t)(tσi(t)) =
n∑
i=1
aσi(t)Λh(i)(t)
=
n∑
i=1
aσi(t)
i∑
j=1
(
Λh(j)(t) − Λh(j−1)(t)
)
=
n∑
j=1
(
Λh(j)(t) − Λh(j−1)(t)
) n∑
i=j
aσi(t)
=
n∑
j=1
(
Λh(j)(t) − Λh(j−1)(t)
)
θj(t).
Now, as a subordinator is a process with independent increments, we can compute
E
( n∏
i=1
e−aiΛhi(ti)
)
= E
(
e−
∑n
i=1 aiΛhi(ti)
)
= E
(
e
−∑nj=1 (Λh(j)(t)−Λh(j−1)(t)) θj(t))
=
n∏
j=1
E
(
e
−θj(t)
(
Λh(j)(t)
−Λh(j−1)(t)
))
=
n∏
j=1
eΨ(−θj(t))
(
h(j)(t)−h(j−1)(t)
)
= e
∑n
j=1 h(j)(t)
(
Ψ(−θj(t))−Ψ(−θj+1(t))
)
where in the last equation we have considered that h(0)(t)) = 0, θn+1(t) = 0 and
so Ψ(−θn+1(t)) = 0. Finally, considering also the relationship between θj+1(t) and
θj(t), we can compute
F τ1,...,τn(t1, . . . , tn) := P(τi > ti, i = 1, . . . , n) = E
( n∏
i=1
e−aiΛhi(ti)
)
e−
∑n
i=1 bi hi(ti)
= e−
∑n
j=1 h(j)(t)
(
Ψ(−θj+1(t))−Ψ(−θj(t))
)
e−
∑n
i=1 bi hi(ti)
= e
−∑nj=1 h(j)(t)(Ψ(−θj(t)+aσj(t))−Ψ(−θj(t))) e−∑ni=1 bσi(t) hσi(t)(tσi(t))
= e
−∑nj=1 (Ψ(−θj(t)+aσj(t))−Ψ(−θj(t))+bσj(t))hσj(t)(tσj(t))
Remark that, for the monotonicity property of the Laplace exponent, we have
Ψ(−θj(t) + aσj(t))−Ψ(−θj(t)) + bσj(t) > 0.
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Alternately, introducing the permutation σ−1j (t), i.e. the inverse permutation
of σj(t), we can write
F τ1,...,τn(t1, . . . , tn) = e
−∑nj=1 (Ψ(−θσ−1
j
(t)
(t)+aj)−Ψ(−θσ−1
j
(t)
(t))+bj
)
hj(tj)
=
n∏
j=1
Gj(tj)
−
(
Ψ(−θ
σ−1
j
(t)
(t)+aj)−Ψ(−θσ−1
j
(t)
(t))+bj
)
=
n∏
j=1
Gj(tj)
−
(
Ψ(−θ
σ−1
j
(t)
(t)+aj)−Ψ(−θσ−1
j
(t)
(t))+Ψ(−aj)+bj−Ψ(−aj)
)
=
n∏
j=1
(
Gj(tj)
(bj−Ψ(−aj)))−(Ψ(−θσ−1j (t)(t)+aj)−(Ψ(−θσ−1j (t)(t))−Ψ(−aj))bj−Ψ(−aj) +1)
=
n∏
j=1
(
F τj(tj)
)−(Ψ(−θσ−1j (t)(t)+aj)−(Ψ(−θσ−1j (t)(t))−Ψ(−aj))
bj−Ψ(−aj) +1
)
.
The survival copula
The survival copula is defined as
Ĉτ1,...,τn(u1, . . . , un) = F τ1,...,τn(F
−1
τ1
(u1), . . . , F
−1
τn (un))
= F τ1,...,τn(t1(u1), . . . , tn(un)) = F τ1,...,τn(t(u))
where t(u) is the vector with components ti(ui), by which we mean F
−1
τi
(ui). So
we have
Ĉτ1,...,τn(u1, . . . , un) = e
−∑nj=1 (Ψ(−θj(t(u))+aσj(t(u)))−Ψ(−θj(t(u)))+bσj(t(u)))hσj(t(u))(tσj(t(u))(uσj(t(u))))
Let us introduce the following notation:
σ̂j(u) := σj(t(u))
and the following characterization, directly in terms of the vector u:
si(u) := − 1
bi −Ψ(−ai) log ui = log(ui)
− 1
bi−Ψ(−ai) .
Thank’s to the relationship (∗), to arrange in order of increasing magnitude hi(ti(ui))
we can put in an increasing order − log ui
bi−Ψ(−ai) ; we consider the permutation σ̂j(u)
as the permutation (not necessarily unique) such that
− log uσ̂j−1(u)
bσ̂j−1(u) −Ψ(−aσ̂j−1(u))
≤ − log uσ̂j(u)
bσ̂j(u) −Ψ(−aσ̂j(u))
j = 2, . . . , n.
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It follows that, considering the following reordering for si(u)
s(1)(u) ≤ s(2)(u) ≤ . . . ≤ s(n)(u),
the permutation σ̂j(u) is defined by
− log uσ̂j(u)
bσ̂j(u) −Ψ(−aσ̂j(u))
= s(j)(u).
Let us also introduce the following notation:
θ̂j(u) := θj(t(u)) =
n∑
i=j
aσi(t(u)) =
n∑
i=j
aσ̂i(u),
For the copula computation we have the following lemma:
Lemma 1. The survival copula of the vector τ1, . . . , τn is
Ĉτ1,...,τn(u1, . . . , un) = e
∑n
j=1
(
Ψ(−θ̂j(u)+aσ̂j(u))−Ψ(−θ̂j(u))+bσ̂j(u)
) log uσ̂j(u)
bσ̂j(u)
−Ψ(−aσ̂j(u))
=
n∏
j=1
u
Ψ(−θ̂j(u)+aσ̂j(u))−Ψ(−θ̂j(u))+bσ̂j(u)
bσ̂j(u)
−Ψ(−aσ̂j(u))
σ̂j(u)
=
n∏
j=1
((
uσ̂j(u)
) 1bσ̂j(u)−Ψ(−aσ̂j(u)))Ψ(−θ̂j(u)+aσ̂j(u))−Ψ(−θ̂j(u))+bσ̂j(u) .
In our model we’ll assume the parameters constraint bi−Ψ(−ai) = 1, by which
the marginal survival distributions are exactly Gi. We will calibrate the model as
in Mai and Scherer [3] in two steps: we’ll first calibrate the marginal distributions,
and then the copula.
Cor 1. In case bi = 0, ai = 1 and Ψ(−1) = −1 we find the Mai and Scherer
copula given by
Ĉτ1,...,τn(u1, . . . , un) =
n∏
i=1
u
Ψ(−(i−1))−Ψ(−i)
(i) .
Proof of Cor 1. In fact, with those parameters,
si(u) := − log ui
bi −Ψ(−ai) = − log ui, i = 1, . . . n,
and so the permutation σ̂j(u) is linked to the permutation σi of the reordering of
ui, as follows
uσ̂j(u) = u(n−j+1) = uσn−j+1 .
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Moreover θ̂j(u) = n− j + 1 and so the copula becomes
n∏
j=1
u
Ψ(−(n−j))−Ψ(−(n−j+1))
(n−j+1) =
n∏
i=1
u
Ψ(−(i−1))−Ψ(−i)
(i) .
1.4.1 Heterogeneous case with r different homogeneous classes
Let us in general suppose that according to their rating classes our n firms can
be divided into r different classes with the related r parameters ai, bi and hazard
function hi. In this case we can consider the first m1 firms of type 1, other m2 firms
of type 2, and so on up to the remaining mr firms of class r, with n = m1 +m2 +
. . . + mr. In other words, denoting M1 = m1, M2 = m1 + m2, M` = M`−1 + m`,
` ≤ r, we assume

ai = a
(1) and bi = b
(1), for i = 1, . . . ,m1 = M1
ai = a
(2) and bi = b
(2), for i = M1 + 1, . . . ,m1 +m2 = M2
. . .
ai = a
(r) and bi = b
(r), for i = Mr−1 + 1, . . . ,Mr(= n)
(∗m)
For the reason previously explained, we assume bi −Ψ(−ai) = 1 for each i.
Other two reasonable assumptions about the r classes are the following:
the related hazard functions h(i)(t) are such that, for each t,
h(1)(t) ≤ h(2)(t) ≤ . . . ≤ h(r)(t) (∗h)
and
a(1) ≤ a(2) ≤ . . . ≤ a(r) (∗a).
So we have
a(1)Λh(1)(t) ≤ a(2)Λh(2)(t) ≤ . . . ≤ a(r)Λh(r)(t).
With our further assumption
b(l) −Ψ(−a(l)) = 1 ⇔ b(l) = 1 + Ψ(−a(l)), l = 1, . . . , r (∗p)
and considering that Ψ is strictly increasing, we also get
b(1) ≥ b(2) ≥ . . . ≥ b(r). (∗b)
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For each firm in a class (l), l = 1, . . . , r, we can denote the common subordi-
nator as
Λ(l)(t) := a(l)Λh(l)(t) + b
(l)h(l)(t).
Let us denote the classes M` := {Ml−1 + 1, ...,Ml} and remark that our as-
sumptions imply that, if i ∈M` and j ∈M`+1, we have the survival distributions
stochastic ordering
P(τi > t) = Gi(t) ≥ P(τj > t) = Gj(t).
In other words the default risk classes M` are ordered such that the first class is
the less risky, while the last class is the more risky.
As we’ll see these assumptions will simplify the computation of the portfolio loss
distribution, and in particular allow us to easily compute the survival probability
involving all the variables τi
P(τ1 > t, τ2 > t, . . . τn > t).
In fact we have the following proposition:
Prop. 1. Under the above assumptions (*a), (*b), (*h) and (*p) on the parame-
ters constraints, we get
P
(
τi > t, ∀i ∈ Ij, ∀j = 1, . . . r
)
= e−
∑r
j=1
(
Ψ(−∑r`=j+1 k` a(`))−Ψ(−∑r`=j k` a(`))+kj (Ψ(−a(j))+1))h(j)(t) (1.1)
where kj = |Ij|.
Let us remark that this formula depends on the parameters a(j) but not on b(j).
Proof of Prop 1. We have
n∑
i=1
aiΛhi(ti) =
r∑
`=1
m` a
(`) Λh(`)(t)
=
r∑
`=1
m` a
(`)
i∑
j=1
(
Λh(j)(t) − Λh(j−1)(t)
)
=
r∑
j=1
(
Λh(j)(t) − Λh(j−1)(t)
) r∑
i=j
m` a
(`)
=
n∑
j=1
(
Λh(j)(t) − Λh(j−1)(t)
)
θrj ,
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where
θrj :=
r∑
`=j
m` a
(`).
We can thus compute
P(τ1 > t, τ2 > t, . . . , τn > t) = E
( n∏
i=1
e−aiΛhi(t)
)
e−
∑n
i=1 bi hi(ti)
= e−
∑r
j=1 h
(j)(t)
(
Ψ(−θrj+mj a(j))−Ψ(−θrj
)
e−
∑r
i=1 b
(j) h(j)(t)
= e−
∑r
j=1
(
Ψ(−θrj+mj a(j))−Ψ(−θrj )+mj b(j)
)
h(j)(t)
= e−
∑r
j=1
(
Ψ(−∑r`=j+1 m` a(`))−Ψ(−∑r`=j m` a(`))+mj b(j))h(j)(t)(1.2)
P
(
τi > t, ∀i ∈ Ij, ∀j = 1, . . . r
)
= e−
∑r
j=1
(
Ψ(−∑r`=j+1 k` a(`))−Ψ(−∑r`=j k` a(`))+kj b(j))h(j)(t)
= e−
∑r
j=1
(
Ψ(−∑r`=j+1 k` a(`))−Ψ(−∑r`=j k` a(`))+kj (Ψ(−a(j))+1))h(j)(t) (1.3)
where kj = |Ij|.
The Correlation Coefficient
An interesting computation involves the default correlation of firms i and j up to
time t.
Let us define the stochastic processes Ai = {Ait}t≥0 for i = 1, ..., n by
Ait := 1{Ei<Λi(hi(t))}
so that the i-th default time can be defined by
τi = inf{t > 0 : Ei < Λi(hi(t))} = inf{t > 0 : Ait = 1}.
Prop. 2. Consider two firms i and j in the rating classes Mm and Mn respec-
tively, with m < n; the covariance coefficient Cov[Ait, A
j
t ] is given by
Cov[Ait, A
j
t ] = G
(m)
(t)G
(n)
(t)
(
max
(
G
(m)
(t), G
(n)
(t)
)(Ψ(−a(m))+Ψ(−a(n))−Ψ(−(a(m)+a(n))))−1).
while the correlation coefficient Corr[Ait, A
j
t ] is given by
Corr[Ait, A
j
t ] =
√
G
(m)
(t)
√
G
(n)
(t)
(
max
(
G
(m)
(t), G
(n)
(t)
)(Ψ(−a(m))+Ψ(−a(n))−Ψ(−(a(m)+a(n)))) − 1)√
1−G(m)(t)
√
1−G(n)(t)
.
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If instead i and j (i 6= j) are in the same rating class Mm we have
Cov[Ait, A
j
t ] = G
(m)2
(t)(G
(m)
(t)(−Ψ(−2a
(m))+2Ψ(−a(m))) − 1).
and
Corr[Ait, A
j
t ] =
G
(m)
(t)
(
G
(m)
(t)(−Ψ(−2a
(m))+2Ψ(−a(m))) − 1)
1−G(m)(t)
.
Proof of Prop 2. Let us start by the case i ∈Mm, j ∈Mn, with m < n. In this
case we have
ai = a
(m) ≤ aj = a(n),
bj = b
(m) ≥ bj = b(n),
hi = h
(m) ≤ hj = h(n),
Gi(t) = G
(m)
(t) = e−h
(m)(t),
Gj(t) = G
(n)
(t) = e−h
(n)(t).
Cov[Ait, A
j
t ] = Cov[1−Ait, 1−Ajt ]
= P(τi > t, τj > t)− P(τi > t)P(τj > t)
= E[e−(aiΛhi(t)+ajΛhj(t))]e−bihi(t)−bjhj(t) −Gi(t)Gj(t)
= E[e−(a
(m)Λ
h(m)(t)
+a(n)Λ
h(n)(t)
)
]e−b
(m)h(m)(t)−b(n)h(n)(t) −G(m)(t)G(n)(t)
= E[e−(a
(m)+a(n))Λ
h(m)(t)
−a(n)(Λ
h(n)(t)
−Λ
h(m)(t)
)
]e−b
(m)h(m)(t)−b(n)h(n)(t) −G(m)(t)G(n)(t)
= E[e−(a
(m)+a(n))Λ
h(m)(t) ]E[e−a
(n)(Λ
h(n)(t)
−Λ
h(m)(t)
)
]e−b
(m)h(m)(t)−b(n)h(n)(t) −G(m)(t)G(n)(t)
= eh
(m)(t)Ψ(−(a(m)+a(n)))e(h
(n)(t)−h(m)(t))Ψ(−a(n))e−b
(m)h(m)(t)−b(n)h(n)(t) −G(m)(t)G(n)(t).
Now, considering that
eh
(m)(t)Ψ
(
−(a(m)+a(n))
)
e(h
(n)(t)−h(m)(t))Ψ(−a(n))e−b
(m)h(m)(t)−b(n)h(n)(t)
= eh
(n)(t)
(
Ψ(−a(n))−b(n)
)
eh
(m)(t)
(
−b(m)−Ψ(−a(n)))+Ψ(−(a(m)+a(n)))
)
= eh
(n)(t)
(
Ψ(−a(n))−b(n)
)
eh
(m)(t)
(
−b(m)+Ψ(−a(m))−Ψ(−a(m))−Ψ(−a(n))+Ψ(−(a(m)+a(n)))
)
and taking into account condition (*p) and that
G
(m)
(t) = e−h
(m)(t) G
(n)
(t) = e−h
(n)(t),
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we can write this formula as
= G
(m)
(t)G
(n)
(t) eh
(m)(t)
(
−Ψ(−a(m)))−Ψ(−a(n)))+Ψ(−(a(m)+a(n)))
)
.
So we have
Cov[Ait, A
j
t ] = G
(m)
(t)G
(n)
(t)
(
eh
(m)(t)
(
−Ψ(−a(m))−Ψ(−a(n))+Ψ(−(a(m)+a(n)))
)
− 1
)
that is equivalent to
Cov[Ait, A
j
t ] = G
(m)
(t)G
(n)
(t)
(
e−h
(m)(t)
(
Ψ(−a(m))+Ψ(−a(n))−Ψ(−(a(m)+a(n)))
)
− 1
)
and taking into account that G
(m)
(t) = max
(
G
(m)
(t), G
(n)
(t)
)
we finally have
Cov[Ait, A
j
t ] = G
(m)
(t)G
(n)
(t)
(
max
(
G
(m)
(t), G
(n)
(t)
)(Ψ(−a(m))+Ψ(−a(n))−Ψ(−(a(m)+a(n))))−1).
To compute the correlation coefficient Corr[Ait, A
j
t ] we need to compute the variance
V ar(Ait). We have
V ar(Ait) = V ar(1− Ait)
= P(τi > t)(1− P(τi > t)
= Gi(t)(1−Gi(t)).
Of course if the firm i is in the rating class Mm, we can write the previous
formula as
V ar(Ait) = G
(m)
(t)(1−G(m)(t)).
We can thus compute the correlation coefficient between firm i and firm j as
Corr[Ait, A
j
t ] =
Cov[Ait, A
i
t]√
V ar[Ait]
√
V ar[Ajt ]
=
G
(m)
(t)G
(n)
(t)
(
max
(
G
(m)
(t), G
(n)
(t)
)(Ψ(−a(m))+Ψ(−a(n))−Ψ(−(a(m)+a(n)))) − 1)√
G
(m)
(t)(1−G(m)(t))
√
G
(n)
(t)(1−G(n)(t))
=
√
G
(m)
(t)
√
G
(n)
(t)
(
max
(
G
(m)
(t), G
(n)
(t)
)(Ψ(−a(m))+Ψ(−a(n))−Ψ(−(a(m)+a(n)))) − 1)√
1−G(m)(t)
√
1−G(n)(t)
.
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If instead i, j ∈Mm, in the previous formula we have
a(m) = a(n),
G(m)(t) = G(n)(t),
and so we have
Corr[Ait, A
j
t ] =
G
(m)
(t)
(
G
(m)
(t)(−Ψ(−2a
(m))+2Ψ(−a(m))) − 1)
1−G(m)(t)
.
The Loss Distribution
Let us assume a homogeneous portfolio in which each firm has the same weight.
The zero-recovery loss process Ln = {Ln(t)}t≥0 is defined as
Ln(t) :=
1
n
n∑
i=1
Ait.
Thus Ln(t) gives the fraction of defaulted names in the portfolio up to time t.
To compute the portfolio loss distribution we want to compute, for k ∈ {0, . . . , n},
P(nLn(t) = k).
We have the following proposition:
Prop. 3. The distribution of Ln(t) is given by
P(nLn(t) = k)
=
∑
· · ·
∑
0≤kj≤mj
k1+...+kr=n−k
k∑
v=0
(−1)v
∑
· · ·
∑
v1+···+vr=v
0≤vj≤mj−kj
r∏
j=1
mj !
kj !vj !(mj − kj − vj)!
(
G
(j)
(t)
)Φ(j)
,
where
Φ(j) = Ψ(−
r∑
`=j+1
(k` + v`) a
(`))−Ψ(−
r∑
`=j
k` a
(`)) + kj (Ψ(−a(j) + 1).
Proof of Prop 3. To compute the portfolio loss distribution we use formulas (1.2)
and (1.3). We have
P(nLn(t) = n− k) =
∑
· · ·
∑
0≤kj≤mj
k1+...+kr=k
P(∀j = 1, . . . , r ∃Ij : |Ij| = kj, τi > t, ∀i ∈ Ij, ; τi′ ≤ t, ∀i′ ∈Mj\Ij)
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where Mj = {Mj−1 + 1, . . . ,Mj}
=
∑
· · ·
∑
0≤kj≤mj
k1+...+kr=k
r∏
j=1
(
mj
kj
)
P(τi > t, τi′ ≤ t, Mj−1 < i ≤Mj−1 + kj, Mj−1 + kj < i′ ≤Mj, j = 1, . . . , r)
Considering that
P(τi > t, τi′ ≤ t, Mj−1 < i ≤Mj−1 + kj, Mj−1 + kj < i′ ≤Mj, j = 1, . . . , r)
= P(A ∩Bc) = P(A)− P(A ∩B)
where
A = {τi > t, Mj−1 < i ≤Mj−1 + kj, j = 1, . . . , r}
and
Bc = {τi′ ≤ t, Mj−1 + kj < i′ ≤Mj, j = 1, . . . , r}
so that
B =
⋃
j=1,...,r
⋃
Mj−1+kj<i′≤Mj
{τi′ > t}
we have
P(A)− P(A ∩B) = P(A)− P( ⋃
j=1,...,r
⋃
Mj−1+kj<i′≤Mj
A ∩ {τi′ > t}
)
and, using the inclusion/exclusion formula, we get
= P(A)−
n−k∑
v=1
∑
· · ·
∑
v1+···+vr=v
0≤vj≤mj−kj
(−1)v+1
r∏
j=1
(
mj − kj
vj
)
P(A, τi′ > t, Mj−1+kj < i′ ≤Mj−1+kj+vj, j = 1, . . . , r)
(where by {A, , τi′ > t, etc.} we mean A ∩ {τi′ > t, etc.})
n−k∑
v=0
∑
· · ·
∑
v1+···+vr=v
0≤vj≤mj−kj
(−1)v
r∏
j=1
(
mj − kj
vj
)
P(A, τi′ > t, Mj−1+kj < i′ ≤Mj−1+kj+vj, j = 1, . . . , r)
having used that
P(A) =
∑
· · ·
∑
v1+···+vr=0
0≤vj≤mj−kj
(−1)0
r∏
j=1
(
mj − kj
vj
)
P(A, τi′ > t, Mj−1+kj < i′ ≤Mj−1+kj+vj, j = 1, . . . , r)
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P(A) =
∑
· · ·
∑
vj=0,j=1,...,r
(−1)0
r∏
j=1
(
mj − kj
0
)
P(A, τi′ > t, Mj−1+kj < i′ ≤Mj−1+kj+0, j = 1, . . . , r)
where the condition τi′ > t, Mj−1 + kj < i′ ≤Mj−1 + kj + 0 is pointless as not
involving any index i′.
With our assumptions (∗h), (∗a) and (∗b) on the coefficients a(i), b(i) and the
functions h(i)(t), we obtain
P(nLn(t) = n− k)
=
∑
· · ·
∑
0≤kj≤mj
k1+...+kr=k
r∏
j=1
(
mj
kj
)
P(τi > t, τi′ ≤ t, Mj−1 < i ≤Mj−1 + kj , Mj−1 + kj < i′ ≤Mj , j = 1, . . . , r)
=
∑
· · ·
∑
0≤kj≤mj
k1+...+kr=k
n−k∑
v=0
(−1)v
∑
· · ·
∑
v1+···+vr=v
0≤vj≤mj−kj
r∏
j=1
(
mj
kj
) r∏
j=1
(
mj − kj
vj
)
P(τi > t, Mj−1 < i ≤Mj−1 + kj + vj , j = 1, . . . , r)
=
∑
· · ·
∑
0≤kj≤mj
k1+...+kr=k
n−k∑
v=0
(−1)v
∑
· · ·
∑
v1+···+vr=v
0≤vj≤mj−kj
r∏
j=1
mj !
kj !vj !(mj − kj − vj)!P(τi > t, Mj−1 < i ≤Mj−1 + kj + vj , j = 1, . . . , r)
=
∑
· · ·
∑
0≤kj≤mj
k1+...+kr=k
n−k∑
v=0
(−1)v
∑
· · ·
∑
v1+···+vr=v
0≤vj≤mj−kj
r∏
j=1
mj !
kj !vj !(mj − kj − vj)!
e−
∑r
j′=1
(
Ψ(−∑r
`=j′+1(k`+v`) a
(`))−Ψ(−∑r
`=j′ k` a
(`))+kj′ b
(j′)
)
v(j
′)(t)
and in the same way we get
P(nLn(t) = k)
=
∑
· · ·
∑
0≤kj≤mj
k1+...+kr=n−k
r∏
j=1
(
mj
kj
)
P(τi > t, τi′ ≤ t, Mj−1 < i ≤Mj−1 + kj , Mj−1 + kj < i′ ≤Mj , j = 1, . . . , r)
=
∑
· · ·
∑
0≤kj≤mj
k1+...+kr=n−k
k∑
v=0
(−1)v
∑
· · ·
∑
v1+···+vr=v
0≤vj≤mj−kj
r∏
j=1
(
mj
kj
) r∏
j=1
(
mj − kj
vj
)
P(τi > t, Mj−1 < i ≤Mj−1 + kj + vj , j = 1, . . . , r)
=
∑
· · ·
∑
0≤kj≤mj
k1+...+kr=n−k
k∑
v=0
(−1)v
∑
· · ·
∑
v1+···+vr=v
0≤vj≤mj−kj
r∏
j=1
mj !
kj !vj !(mj − kj − vj)!P(τi > t, Mj−1 < i ≤Mj−1 + kj + vj , j = 1, . . . , r)
=
∑
· · ·
∑
0≤kj≤mj
k1+...+kr=n−k
k∑
v=0
(−1)v
∑
· · ·
∑
v1+···+vr=v
0≤vj≤mj−kj
r∏
j=1
mj !
kj !vj !(mj − kj − vj)!
e−
∑r
j′=1
(
Ψ(−∑r
`=j′+1(k`+v`) a
(`))−Ψ(−∑r
`=j′ k` a
(`))+kj′ b
(j′)
)
v(j
′)(t).
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Let us note that the final exponential factor can be written as
e−
∑r
j′=1
(
Ψ(−∑r`=j′+1(k`+v`) a(`))−Ψ(−∑r`=j′ k` a(`))+kj′ b(j′)) v(j′)(t)
=
r∏
j′=1
(
e−v
(j′)(t))Ψ(−∑r`=j′+1(k`+v`) a(`))−Ψ(−∑r`=j′ k` a(`))+kj′ b(j′)
=
r∏
j′=1
(
G
(j′)
(t)
)Ψ(−∑r`=j′+1(k`+v`) a(`))−Ψ(−∑r`=j′ k` a(`))+kj′ b(j′)
so the final result is
P(nLn(t) = k)
=
∑
· · ·
∑
0≤kj≤mj
k1+...+kr=n−k
k∑
v=0
(−1)v
∑
· · ·
∑
v1+···+vr=v
0≤vj≤mj−kj
r∏
j=1
mj !
kj !vj !(mj − kj − vj)!
(
G
(j)
(t)
)Ψ(−∑r`=j+1(k`+v`) a(`))−Ψ(−∑r`=j k` a(`))+kj b(j) .
Theorem 1 (Portfolio-loss distribution approximation). Let us denote L
(i)
mi(t) the
fraction of defaulted names in the rating class (i) (with respectively mi firms) of
the portfolio up to time t
L(i)mi(t) :=
1
mi
mi∑
j=1
A
Mi−1+j
t
and let us denote
L(i)∞ (t) := 1− e−(a
(i)Λ
h(i)(t)
+b(i)h(i)(t))
Under P(.|FΛ∞),
miL
(i)
mi
(t) ∼ Bin(mi, 1− e−(a
(i)Λ
h(i)(t)
+b(i)h(i)(t))
) = Bin(mi, 1− e−Λ(i)(h(i)(t))).
Moreover for fixed t ≥ 0, L(i)mi(t) tends to the variable L(i)∞ (t) in L2 as mi tends to
infinity.
Let us now consider the overall portfolio
Ln(t) =
1
n
r∑
i=1
miL
(i)
mi
(t).
Let us denote the portfolio loss conditioned average by Lˆn(t) := E[Ln(t)|FΛ∞].
Then we have
Lˆn(t) =
1
n
r∑
i=1
mi(1− e−Λ(i)(h(i)(t)))
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and
Ln(t)− Lˆn(t) −→n→∞ 0,
in L2 for each t. So we can use Lˆn(t) as an approximation ofLn(t) and in partic-
ular, for the approximation error, we have the upper bound of
∑r
i=1
√
mi
n
.
Proof of Theorem 1. In each rating class (i) the firms are homogeneus and
conditionally independent. So we have that under P(.|FΛ∞), {AMi−1+jt }j=1,...,mi are
independent and follow a Bernoulli distribution with success probability given by
P(AMi−1+jt = 1|FΛ∞) = P(Ej < Λ(i)(h(i)(t))|FΛ∞) = E[P(Ej < Λ(i)(h(i)(t))|Λ(i)(h(i)(t))] = 1−e−Λ
(i)(h(i)(t))
for j = Mi−1 + 1, . . . ,Mi and for i = 1, . . . , r.
To show the L2-convergence of L
(i)
mi(t) we compute
E[L(i)mi(t)] = G
(i)(t),
E[L(i)mi(t)(1− e−Λ
(i)(h(i)(t)))] = E[(1− e−Λ(i)(h(i)(t)))2],
E[L(i)mi(t))
2] =
G(i)(t)
mi
+
mi − 1
mi
E[(1− e−Λ(i)(h(i)(t)))2].
It thus follows that
E[L(i)mi(t)− (1− e−Λ
(i)(h(i)(t))))2]
= E[(L(i)mi(t))
2]− 2E[L(i)mi(t)(1− e−Λ
(i)(h(i)(t)))] + E[(1− e−Λ(i)(h(i)(t)))2]
=
G(i)(t)
mi
+
mi − 1
mi
E[(1− e−Λ(i)(h(i)(t)))2]− E[(1− e−Λ(i)(h(i)(t)))2]
=
1
mi
G(i)(t)− 1
mi
E[(1− e−Λ(i)(h(i)(t)))2]→mi→∞ 0.
Similarly, for the overall portfolio loss approximation, we want to prove the L2
convergence. We have
Ln(t) =
1
n
n∑
l=1
Alt =
1
n
r∑
i=1
mi∑
j=1
A
Mi−1+j
t
and so
Lˆn(t) = E[Ln(t)|FΛ∞] =
1
n
r∑
i=1
mi∑
j=1
E[AMi−1+jt |FΛ∞] =
1
n
r∑
i=1
mi∑
j=1
(1−e−Λ(i)(h(i)(t))) = 1
n
r∑
i=1
mi(1−e−Λ(i)(h(i)(t))).
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E[(Ln(t)− Lˆn(t))2] = E
[(
1
n
r∑
i=1
mi
mi
mi∑
j=1
A
Mi−1+j
t −
1
n
r∑
i=1
mi(1− e−Λ(i)(h(i)(t)))
)2]
= E
[( r∑
i=1
mi
n
(
1
mi
mi∑
j=1
A
Mi−1+j
t − (1− e−Λ
(i)(h(i)(t))))
)2]
.
According to our notation we can write the previous formula as
E
[( r∑
i=1
mi
n
(L(i)mi(t)− L(i)∞ (t))
)2]
Thus the thesis follows by using the Minkowsky inequality, as we have
‖
r∑
i=1
mi
n
(L(i)mi − L(i)∞ )‖L2 ≤
r∑
i=1
‖mi
n
(L(i)mi − L(i)∞ )‖L2 −→mi,n→∞ 0.
About the upper bound for the approximation error we have
‖L(i)mi − L(i)∞‖2L2 =
1
mi
G(i)(t)− 1
mi
E[(1− e−Λ(i)(h(i)(t)))2] ≤ 1
mi
and so
‖
r∑
i=1
mi
n
(L(i)mi − L(i)∞ )‖L2 ≤
r∑
i=1
mi
n
√
1
mi
=
r∑
i=1
√
mi
n
.
1.5 Applications
As pricing application of our dependence model between default times we consider
a portfolio of credit-risky assets, and in particular the iTraxx Europe, that can be
considered a synthetic CDO being an equally weighted portfolio of n = 125 CDS
contracts on the European firms.
1.5.1 Pricing CDO tranches
CDOs are constructed by partitioning the credit portfolio in tranches with differ-
ent seniority: each tranche represents a certain loss piece of the overall portfolio
and is defined via its lower and upper attachment points. In particular in the
iTraxx Europe there are J = 6 tranches defined by the following lower and upper
attachment points lj and uj, j = 1, . . . , 6:
[0%, 3%], [3%, 6%], [6%, 9%], [9%, 12%], [12%, 22%], [22%, 100%].
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The insurance seller receives periodic premium payments depending on the re-
maining nominal and the spread of the tranche, while the insurance buyer is com-
pensated for losses affecting his tranche. Let us fix a quarterly payment schedule
for five years T = {t0 = 0 < t1 < . . . < tM = 5} (M = 20) and assume a constant
recovery rate R = 40% for all companies. The loss L
(j)
t affecting tranche j up to
time t is linked to the overall portfolio loss (1−R)Lnt via
L
(j)
t = min(max(0, (1−R)Lnt − lj), uj − lj),
where uj − lj is a cap to the potential loss equal to the whole tranche. The
remaining nominal of the portfolio at time t is given by Nomt = 1−Lnt , while the
remaining nominal of tranche j is Nom
(j)
t = u
j − lj − L(j)t .
Pricing a tranche corresponds to assessing the fair spread such that the ex-
pected discounted payment streams of the tranche agree. Defining the Expected
Discounted Default Leg for tranche j (EDDL(j)) as the compensations for defaults
that affect tranche j
EDDL(j) =
∑
tk∈T
e−rtk(E[L(j)tk ]− E[L(j)tk−1 ]) (1.4)
and the Expected Discounted Premium Leg (EDPL(j)) as the periodic payments
depending on the remaining nominal of tranche j
EDPL(j) =
∑
tk∈T
∆tke
−rtks(j)T (u
j − lj − E[L(j)tk ]) (1.5)
the fair spread is thus given by the following ratio:
s
(j)
T =
∑
tk∈T e
−rtk(E[L(j)tk ]− E[L(j)tk−1 ])∑
tk∈T ∆tke
−rtk(uj − lj − E[L(j)tk ])
, (1.6)
where e−rtk are the discount factors and ∆tk = tk − tk−1.
The CDS spread for each tranche is quoted in basis points and the previous
equation is true for each tranche except the first, the so-called equity-tranche, for
which market convention is to use a running spread of 500 basis points plus an
upfront payment quoted as a percentage of the nominal; for this first tranche we
have
s
(1)
T = (EDDL
(1) − 500bp ∗ EDPL(1))/u1. (1.7)
For the pricing of each tranche we need to compute
E[L(j)(t)] = E[min(Max(0, (1−R)Ln(t)− lj), uj − lj)]
=
n∑
k=0
P
(
Ln(t) =
k
n
)
∗min
(
Max
(
0, (1−R)k
n
− lj
)
, uj − lj
)
.
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We can compute the exact formula above and the formula obtained with the
approximation for the portfolio loss distribution:
E[L(j)(t)] ≈ E
[
min
(
Max
(
0, (1−R)
(
1
n
r∑
i=1
mi(1−e−Λ(i)(h(i)(t)))
)
− lj
)
, uj− lj
)]
.
In both cases we need to specify the Le´vy subordinator that we use to model
the dependence structure.
1.5.2 The Le´vy Subordinator
For our applications we use the three Le´vy subordinators described in the third
paragraph:
• the Inverse Gaussian Subordinator ;
• the Gamma Subordinator ;
• the Compound Poisson Subordinator.
Whatever the choice of the subordinator is, in general the dependence structure
is determined by the pair of parameters (η, β), while µ is indirectly specified by the
Le´vy measure of the subordinator via the TN condition for the unit exponential
distribution Ψ(−1) = −1.
In particular, in our paper, having defined the subordinator for each class as
Λ(i)(h(i)(t)) = a(i)Λh(i)(t) + b
(i)h(i)(t), we can assume without loss of generality
µ = 0.
In fact let us denote
bˆ(i) := b(i) + µa(i)
and
Ψ0(−a(i)) = Ψ(−a(i)) + µa(i)
and remember the parameters constraint b(i) −Ψ(−a(i)) = 1.
We have
Ψ0(−a(i)) = Ψ(−a(i)) + µa(i) = b(i) − 1 + µa(i) = bˆ(i) − 1.
At this point we can consider µ = 0 and bˆ(i) ≥ 0. We have Ψ0(−a(i)) ≥ −1.
Once we have (η, β), we can compute the Laplace exponent Ψ0(−a(i)) for each
subordinator. For the Inverse Gaussian subordinator we have:
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Ψ0,IG(−a(i)) =
∫ ∞
0
(e−a
(i)s − 1)νIG(ds)
=
1√
2pi
β
∫ ∞
0
(e−a
(i)s − 1)s− 32 e− 12η2sds
= β
(
η −
√
2a(i) + η2
)
.
The constraint Ψ0(−a(i)) ≥ −1 is translated into the following constraint for β:
0 < β ≤
√
2pi∫∞
0
(1− e−a(i)s)s− 32 e− 12η2sds =
1
−η +
√
2a(i) + η2
for each i = 1, . . . , r, and so, as max {a(i)}i=1,...,r = a(r), we want
0 < β ≤ 1
−η +
√
2a(r) + η2
.
For the Gamma subordinator we have:
Ψ0,Γ(−a(i)) =
∫ ∞
0
(e−a
(i)s − 1)νΓ(ds)
= β
∫ ∞
0
(e−a
(i)s − 1)1
s
e−ηsds
= β ln
(
η
a(i) + η
)
and the constraint Ψ0(−a(i)) ≥ −1 is translated into the following constraint for
β:
0 < β ≤ 1∫∞
0
(1− e−a(i)s)1
s
e−ηsds
=
1
ln [a
(i)+η
η
]
for each i = 1, . . . , r, and so, as again max {a(i)}i=1,...,r = a(r), we want
0 < β ≤ 1
ln [a
(r)+η
η
]
.
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Finally, for the Compound Poisson subordinator, we have
Ψ0,P (−a(i)) =
∫ ∞
0
(e−a
(i)s − 1)νP (ds)
= β
∫ ∞
0
(e−a
(i)y − 1)D(y)
= βE[e−a(i)J1 − 1]
= − a
(i)β
a(i) + η
.
and the constraint for β becomes
0 < β ≤ 1
1− E[e−a(r)J1 ] =
a(r) + η
a(r)
.
Before describing the calibration to market data, it is worth noting that we can
model different grades of default dependence between the firms, from a smaller
default dependence corresponding to periods of cyclical up trend (sustained eco-
nomic growth) to a greater default dependence correponding to recessions periods,
by varying the model parameters a(i). In particular we obtain a null correlation
when a(i) → 0: in this case the default times become independent. Viceversa the
correlation is max when a(i) →∞.
1.5.3 The calibration to iTraxx quotes
According to the iTraxx conventions the payment streams for the calibration are
quarterly premium payments with the previously specified attachment points for
the tranches. The discount factors required as input are obtained from risk-free par
yields. The market quotes to which the model is calibrated comprise the portfolio
CDS spreads with maturities three and five years and the spreads for the tranches.
In particular we use the CDS spreads to calibrate the marginal distributions, and
the tranches spreads to calibrate the subordinator parameters. One week of daily
data is used from the seventh series of iTraxx Europe with maturity 5 years ranging
from June 20, 2007, to June 26, 2007, and a calibration is run for each of these
days.
We divide our basket of 125 firms in two classes according to two different
criteria. For the first application we divide the firms according to their spread
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level (meaning considering the medium spread in the considered period). For the
second application we consider the class of the 25 financial firms and the class of
the remaining 100 firms.
The calibration procedure can be split in two different steps, having separated
the dependence structure and marginal default probabilities. The first step in-
volves the calibration of the marginal distributions Gi, {i = 1, . . . , 125}, for which
a piecewise linear intensity is assumed. In particular we consider a CDS with
maturity 3 years and a CDS with maturity 5 years. For each firm we have
1−Gi(t) = e−hi(t) = e−
∫ t
0 λi(s)ds
where we assume the default intensity hi(t) given by
hi(t) =
∫ t
0
λi(s)ds =
∫ t
0
λ3imin{s, 3}+ λ5i (s− 3)1{s>3}ds,
with λ3i and λ
5
i being positive intensity parameters which are calibrated to the
portfolio-CDS spreads for the 3-year and 5-year contract, respectively. We choose
λ3i so that the market 3-year CDS spread agreeds with our CDS spread computed
using the discrete formula
modelCDSspread3i =
1−R
(1+r1)
pi,31 +
1−R
(1+r2)2
pi,32 +
1−R
(1+r3)3
pi,33
1 +
1−pi,31
1+r1
+
1−pi,31 −pi,32
(1+r2)2
where
• pi,3t , t = 1, . . . , 3, are the discrete default probabilities for the event ”For the
firm i there will be default in the year t”, that we compute from our Gi(t)
as
pi,3t = Gi(t)−Gi(t− 1)
with Gi(0) = 0;
• rt, t = 1, . . . , 3 , are the risk free interest rates with maturity T = t used for
the discount factors: in practice we directly use the discount factors related
to the Germany zero curves, downloaded from Datastream.
For the calibration of λ5i , we use instead the 5-year CDS contract and follow
the same procedure with
modelCDSspread5i =
1−R
(1+r1)
pi,31 +
1−R
(1+r2)2
pi,32 +
1−R
(1+r3)3
pi,33 +
1−R
(1+r4)4
pi,54 +
1−R
(1+r5)5
pi,55
1 +
1−pi,31
1+r1
+
1−pi,31 −pi,32
(1+r2)2
+
1−pi,31 −pi,32 −pi,33
(1+r3)3
+
1−pi,31 −pi,32 −pi,33 −pi,54
(1+r4)4
.
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The second step involves the calibration of the parameters of the subordinator
for the two classes in which the iTraxx underlying firms are divided. The intensity
parameters for each firm, λ3i and λ
5
i , are thus fixed and from them we compute
hi(t) for each firm in the iTraxx. We then compute h
(i)(t) for the two considered
classes by taking the average value in each class, as h(i)(t) = 1
mi
∑mi
i=1 hi(t). The
parameters of the subordinator, (η, β), specifying the dependence, as well as the
parameters values a(i), are calibrated to observed market spreads of the tranches of
the CDO. For this, we consider different couples (a(1), a(2)) and for each couple we
define a grid for η. Given η, our subordinator parameters constraint (deriving from
the TN condition) defines an interval for β. On this interval, β is chosen so that the
tranche equity (i.e. the upfront payment) is perfectly matched. Finally, among the
obtained possible parameters, (a(1), a(2), η, β) are chosen to be the minimizer of the
sum of square deviations of market to model spreads over all tranches j = 2, · · · , 5.1
For this we solve, using Matlab, the following minimization problem:
min(η,β,a(i))
5∑
j=2
(
marketspreadj − sjT
)2
where marketspreadj is observed on Bloomberg, and sjT is computed by using 1.6.
1.6 Distress Dependence and Systemic Risk
The multivariate default distribution gives us the joint probability of distress, that
represents the probability of all the institutions in the system (portfolio) becom-
ing distressed, i.e., the tail risk of the system. It is an empirical fact that the
probability that all the banks in the system experience large losses simultaneously,
which embeds the distress dependence, increases in times of financial distress, and
therefore, in such periods, the financial system’s joint probability of distress may
experience larger and nonlinear increases than those experienced by the average
probabilities of default of the individual institutions. Having estimated the mul-
tivariate default distribution of the companies included in the iTraxx, we follow
Segoviano and Goodhart (2010) (see [8] and [7]), to analyze the distress dependence
in the portfolio by computing a set of indicators of systemic risk. In particular we
estimate three stability measures that incorporate changes in distress dependence
that are consistent with the economic cycle. The stability measures that we use
are:
1. The Stability Index ;
1We don’t consider the super senior tranche [22%, 100%] as this tranche is traded very rarely
and we don’t have market quotas for it.
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2. The Distress Dependence Matrix ;
3. The Probability of Cascade Effects.
Once we have computed these stability measures, we employ them to verify which
firms are more systemically relevant for the index as a whole.
1.6.1 The Stability Index
The Stability Index (SI) gives a measure of the tail risk of the system, i.e. the
common distress of the financial institutions in the system. The SI is based on the
conditional expectation of default probability measure developed by Huang (1992)
(see [10]), and measures the expected number of other institutions that would
fall into distress given that at least a specific institution has become distressed
(i.e., were to default). The SI represents a probability measure that conditions on
any institution becoming distressed, without indicating the specific bank. In the
simplest case of two financial institutions with default times τi and τj, let κt stand
for the number of institutions in default at time t. Our extreme linkage indicator
is the conditional expectation E[κt|κt ≥ 1]. From elementary probability theory
we have
SI = E[κt|κt ≥ 1] = P{τi ≤ t, τj > t}+ P{τi > t, τj ≤ t}+ 2P{τi ≤ t, τj ≤ t}P{τi ≤ t or τj ≤ t}
=
P{τi ≤ t}+ P{τj ≤ t}
1− P{τi > t, τj > t}
As Huang (1992) shows, this measure can be intrepreted as a relative measure
of the system linkage: when SI = 1 in the limit, the system linkage is weak
(meaning asympotic independence), while as the value of the SI increases, the
system linkage increases (meaning asympotic dependence).
In our portfolio of 125 firms we divide the group of the 25 financial institutions,
that we consider as the entity i, from the group of the other 100 institutions, that
we consider as the entity j, and we compute the SI with the formula above.
1.6.2 The Distress Dependence Matrix
Distress Dependence between two financial institutions is a measure that computes
the probability that an institution becomes distressed conditional on another en-
tity becoming distressed. Such measure allows analyzing financial stability. The
distress dependence matrix is a matrix based on market data in which are collected
pairwise probabilities of financial institutions experiencing distress conditional on
other institutions being in distress. It thus accounts for the relationship between
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the institutions. Basically the elements of the matrix show the conditional prob-
abilities of distress of the institution in the row, given that the institution in the
column falls into distress. For each pair of institutions in the portfolio, we esti-
mate the pairwise conditional probabilities of distress: the probability of distress
of institution i conditional on institution j becoming distressed is computed as
P(τi ≤ t|τj ≤ t) = P(τi ≤ t, τj ≤ t)P(τj ≤ t) .
Let us denote P(τi ≤ t|τj ≤ t) := P(Firmi|firmj); these pairwise conditional prob-
abilities of distress are represented in the following Distress Dependence Matrix:
Firm1 Firmi (i = 2, . . . , 124) Firm125
Firm1 1 P(Firm1|Firmi) P(Firm1|Firm125)
Firmi (i = 2, . . . , 124) P(Firmi|Firm1) 1 P(Firmi|Firm125)
Firm125 P(Firm125|Firm1) P(Firm125|Firmi) 1
This 125 × 125 matrix contains the probability of distress of the institution
specified in the row, given that the institution specified in the column becomes
distressed. Even if conditional probabilities do not imply causation, this set of
pairwise conditional probabilities can provide important insights into interlinkages
and the likelyhood of contagion between the institutions in the system.
1.6.3 The Probability of Cascade Effects
The Probability of Cascade Effects is an indicator that measures the likelihood
that one, two, or more institutions, up to the total number of financial institutions
in the system become distressed given that a specific financial institution becomes
distressed. In this way it quantifies the potential ”cascade” effects in the system
given the distress in a specific financial institution, and so this measure can be
considered as an indicator that allows to quantify the systemic importance of a
specific institution if it becomes distressed. For this systemic risk indicator we
divide our portfolio into four groups: the group of the financial institutions with
lower spread (denoted FLS), the group of the financial institutions with higher
spread (denoted FHS), the group of the non financial institutions with lower spread
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(denoted NFLS) and the group of the non financial institutions with higher spread
(denoted NFHS). If we consider the higher spread financial institutions group
(FHS) in distress, the Probability of Cascade effects can be defined as:
PCE = P(FLS|FHS) + P(NFLS|FHS) + P(NFHS|FHS)
−[P(FLS ∩NFLS|FHS) + P(FLS ∩NFHS|FHS) + P(NFLS ∩NFHS|FHS)]
+P(FLS ∩NFLS ∩NFHS|FHS). (1.8)
1.7 Conclusions
A multivariate default times model for a portfolio of assets exposed to credit risk
was constructed using a conditional independence approach with a stochastic time-
change as common factor. The dependence structure was kept separated from the
parameters of the marginal default probabilities by choosing a suitable Le´vy sub-
ordinator as stochastic clock. Thanks to this separation between the univariate
marginals and the dependence structure, the implied copula of the default times
could be computed explicitly. Under the assumption of an heterogeneous portfolio,
a closed formula for the portfolio loss distribution was obtained, and an approxima-
tion for large portfolios was presented. The model efficiency was demonstrated by
calibrating it to observed portfolio-CDS and CDO spreads, using an appropriate
Le´vy subordinator. Measures of portfolio systemic risk were computed.
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A Appendix
Copula Functions
Definition 2 (Copula function). A copula is an n-dimensional distribution func-
tion C : [0, 1]n → [0, 1] of a random vector (U1, . . . , Un), where the marginal law of
Ui is the uniform distribution on [0, 1] for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Copula functions are very popular in the study of multivariate distribution
functions thanks to their role in imposing a dependence structure on predeter-
mined marginal distributions. Their importance derives from the Sklar’s theorem
that proves that any multivariate distribution function can be characterized by a
copula, and that copula functions, together with univariate marginal distribution
functions, can be used to construct multivariate distribution functions.
Theorem 2 (Sklar’s theorem). Let H be an n-dimensional distribution function
with marginals F1, . . . , Fn.
Then it exists an n-copula C such that, for each x ∈ Rn,
H(x1, . . . , xn) = C(F1(x1), . . . , Fn(xn)).
If the marginals F1, . . . , Fn are all continuous, then C is unique; otherwise C
is univocally determined on (RanF1×RanF2×RanFn) (where RanFi denotes the
rank of Fi). Conversely, if C is an n-copula and F1, . . . , Fn are distribution func-
tions, then the function H above defined is an n-dimensional distribution function
with marginals F1, . . . , Fn.
The proof of this theorem can be found in [9].
The main feature of the Sklar’s theorem is that for continuous multivariate
distribution functions, the univariate marginals and the multivariate dependence
structure can be separated, and the dependence structure can be represented by
a copula.
Let F be an univariate distribution function. Let’s remenber that the gener-
alised inverse of F is defined as F−1(t) = inf{x ∈ R|F (x) ≥ t} for each t in [0, 1],
with the usual convention that inf() = −∞.
An important corollary of the Sklar’s theorem, that is fundamental in the study
of copulas ana their applications, is the following:
Cor 2. Let H be an n-dimensional distribution function with continuous marginals
F1, . . . , Fn and copula C. Then for each u ∈ [0, 1]n,
C(u1, . . . , un) = H(F
−1
1 (u1), . . . , F
−1
n (un)).
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Levy Processes
Definition 3 (Le´vy process). A Le´vy process is any continuous-time stochastic
process X = {Xt : t ≥ 0} such that
1. X0 = 0 almost surely;
2. It has independent increments: for any 0 ≤ t1 < t2 < . . . < tn < ∞,
Xt2 −Xt1, Xt3 −Xt2, . . ., Xtn −Xtn−1 are independent;
3. It has stationary increments: for any s < t, Xt −Xs is equal in distribution
to Xt−s;
4. t→ Xt is almost surely right continuous with left limits.
The most well-known examples of Le´vy processes are the Wiener process and the
Poisson process.
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Chapter 2
On the Relationship between the
Risk of Default and the
Yield-to-Maturity of Bonds
2.1 Introduction
Credit Default Swap (CDS) spreads and bond spreads (i.e. the spreads between
the bond yield rate and the risk free rate) have become commonly used as de-
fault risk indicators for risk analysis. For example, in Fitch (2010b), we find an
analysis of the CDS spread history and implied annual probability of default for
the U.S. broker-dealers over the past years, while in Fitch (2010a) is studied how
the directional momentum in CDS spreads affects its performance as indicator of
default risk during a stress period. (On the link between CDS spreads and de-
fault probability see also Bank of England, 2009). However, both CDS and bond
spreads depend not only on variables directly linked to the risk of default but also
on the specific structure of the contract. In particular, in this chapter we show
that bond spreads can be misleading if used to infer the default probability of
the issuers, and consequently the yield-to-maturity must be cautiously interpreted
as an indicator of the bond default risk.1 In fact, the yield rate, for given default
probabilities and recovery rates, can considerably vary as a function of the residual
life and the coupon value of the bond. In particular, when there is default risk,
bonds with high coupons are more likely to have high yield rates too (and vicev-
ersa). The intuition behind this result is that greater coupons are associated with
1In particular, without loss of generality, in this chapter we assume that the risk-free rate is
constant in the considered time horizon, so that the yield level provides information analogous
to the spread between the yield rate and the risk-free rate. Anyway the inferred considerations
are still valid, on a quality level, even in case the risk-free rate curve is not flat.
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less than proportional price increases, because there is a probability, linked to the
default likelyhood, that the coupons are not actually payed-off. Bond prices which
are relatively low with respect to the nominal payment flows (on which the yield
is computed) determine nominal yields which are relatively higher. This implies
that bonds with higher default risk can have lower yields (and viceversa), just as
a consequence of their coupon structures.
Also the slope of the yield curve must be cautiously interpreted as in general it
does not convey enough information to establish if the default risk is higher in one
period than in another period. We show that a downward sloping yield curve does
not necessarily imply that the default probability on shorter maturities is higher
than on longer maturities. This result arises from the fact that also the yield curve
slope is linked to the coupon rate: taking fixed the other variables (in particular
the default probability and the recovery rate) bonds with low coupons determine
decreasing yield curves, while bonds with high coupons imply increasing yield
curves. The intuition behind this result is that higher coupons determine losses
relatively higher for bonds with longer maturity in case of default, and consequently
higher yields for these bonds. On the contrary, when the coupons are low, the
nominal losses in case of default are similar both for short term and long term
bonds;2 it follows that the prices of longer maturity bonds, for which the losses
are likely in far away time horizons, are relatively higher, and the corresponding
yields are lower.
Most of the literature available on the valuation of fixed income securities (see
for example Fabozzi, 2003, 2007), is focused on the interest rate risk (i.e. the bond’s
price sensitivity to the change in interest rates) and the concept of duration is used
to describe the relationship between the bond maturity and coupon rate, and the
bond price sensitivity (a longer maturity and a lower coupon rate are linked to a
greater price sensitivity to interest rate changes); in this context a higher bond
yield is considered as a premium for the higher interest rate risk. In this chapter
we study similar financial indicators that could be used in presence of credit (or
default) risk to properly evaluate the relationship between the defaultable bond
yield and its default probability.
2For the zero-coupon bonds, for example, in case of default the loss is always only given by
the amount lost on the bond final pay-off.
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2.2 The mathematical model
Let us consider a discrete times model with times n = 0, 1, . . . , N , in which the
probability of being in default at time n ≥ 1, conditioning to not having incurred
in default in the previous n − 1 periods, is constant and equal to λ. It thus
follows that the unconditioned probability of default has a geometric distribution,
i.e. the unconditional probability that the default time is equal to n is given by
P(τ = n) = λ(1− λ)n−1 for n ≥ 1.
Let us assume a constant risk-free rate r and consider a defaultable bond
with a constant conditional default probability λ, nominal value 100, maturity N ,
annual coupons c and constant recovery rate R/100 in case of default. Under the
hypothesis of risk neutral investors, the price at time 0 of the bond with maturity
N , P (N), is given by the expected value of the future payment flows (expected
payoff) discounted at the risk-free rate:
P (N) =
N∑
n=1
c
(1− λ)n
(1 + r)n
+
N∑
n=1
R
λ(1− λ)n−1
(1 + r)n
+ 100
(1− λ)N
(1 + r)N
. (2.1)
The first term in the right side of equation (2.1) is the present value of the
coupons, which are payed only when there is no default before the time they are
due; the second term represents present value of the recovery rate, that is payed
when the default happens; the last term is the present value of the bond face value,
that is payed at maturity only in case of no previous default.
We define the bond yield-to-maturity as in Hull (2008):
Definition 4. The bond yield-to-maturity is the unique value y such that
P (N) =
N∑
n=1
c
(1 + y)n
+
100
(1 + y)N
. (2.2)
Another concept that we need when we value fixed income securities is that of
par yield, which corresponds to the coupon rate for which the bond is quoted at
par:
Definition 5. The par yield is the coupon rate for which the price of the bond is
equal to its par value (100), i.e. is the unique value cpar/100 such that
P (N) =
N∑
n=1
cpar
(1− λ)n
(1 + r)n
+
N∑
n=1
R
λ(1− λ)n−1
(1 + r)n
+ 100
(1− λ)N
(1 + r)N
= 100. (2.3)
We aim at showing that the yield-to-maturity must be carefully interpreted as a
bond default risk indicator because its value depends also on other bond character-
istics, such as the maturity and the coupon value. Let us start with the following
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lemma that shows that the par yield is unique for all bonds, independently from
the maturity:
Lemma 2. There exists one unique coupon value, cpar, for which all bond prices
are equal to 100, independently from the bond maturities. Such unique value is
given by
cpar =
100r + (100−R)λ
1− λ . (2.4)
Since a bond quoted at par with coupons 100y has yield-to-maturity equal to
y 3, the yield-to-maturity of a bond with coupons equal to cpar is equal to the par
yield. It follows that the term structure for bonds with coupons equal to cpar is
flat at the value cpar/100, whatever is the value of the other variables (default rate,
recovery rate, risk-free rate). Said in other words, equation (2.4) shows that the
values of the default rate, the recovery rate and the risk-free rate determine the
value cpar which, however, is independent of the maturity.
From Lemma 2 we have that bonds with different maturity but analogous
characteristics in terms of default risk (default probability and recovery rate) have
the same yield when the coupons are equal to cpar. Unfortunately this is an
exception, as it is inferred in the following proposition:
Proposition 1. The yield of a bond with maturity N is an increasing function of
the bond coupons.
According to Proposition 1, given two bonds with coupons c1 = cpar + ∆1
and c2 = cpar + ∆1 + ∆2 (with ∆i > 0, i = 1, 2), there exist δ1 and δ2 (with
δi > 0, i = 1, 2) such that the related yields are given by y1 = cpar/100 + δ1 and
y2 = cpar/100 + δ1 + δ2.
4 An interesting result which arises from the proof of
Proposition 1 is that when R = 0 or λ = 0 one has δ = 0 (as equation (A.12) in
the proof is actually an identity). This means that when the recovery rate is equal
to zero, the bond yield is always equal to the par yield, independently from the
other variables value. We get an analogous result when the default probability is
equal to zero; in particular, in this last case, the par yield is equal to the risk-free
rate.
The following proposition extends the previous results by showing that the
term structure for bonds with different residual life depends also on the coupon
rate (assumed to be the same for all the bonds).
Proposition 2. The yield term structure for N bonds with same characteristics
except the maturity (n = 1, . . . , N) is upward sloping (downward sloping) when
the coupon rate is higher (lower) than cpar. The term structure of the bond prices
follows analogous trends.
3Cf. the proof of Proposition 1 in the Appendix
4An analogous relationship holds when...
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2.3 Numerical examples
Let us show now a few numerical examples that highlight what we have proved
formally. Let us consider the case in which r = 3%, R = 80 e λ = 1%. In this case,
using equation (2.4), we have cpar = 3.23%. The related bond yields for different
maturities and coupon rates are:
N c=0% c=1% c=5%
1 3.21% 3.21% 3.25%
5 3.15% 3.18% 3.27%
10 3.08% 3.13% 3.30%
15 3.00% 3.09% 3.32%
This example highlights two interesting features. The first one is that, for a
given coupon rate, the yield is a monotonic function of the bond residual life. In
particular, when the coupon rate is lower (higher) than 3.23% the yield curve is
downward (upward) sloping. The second relevant feature is that the yield is an
increasing function of the coupon rate, for given maturity. The intuition behind
this result is that greater coupons are associated with less than proportional price
increases, because there is a probability, linked to the default likelyhood, that the
coupons are not actually payed-off. In this case, bond prices are relatively low with
respect to the nominal cash flow (on which the yield is computed) and nominal
yields are relatively higher. Let us remark, anyway, that the greater bond risk,
and the associated greater nominal yield, are not determined by a bigger default
probability or a smaller recovery rate, but are given by other characteristics of the
bond (maturity and coupon rate). It follows that it is possible to have different
nominal yields for given default probabilities and recovery rates and viceversa.
Another problem that arises when bond yields are used to extract information
about the issuer default probability, is that this indicator does not reflect the
effective bond duration, that depends on the default rates. Bonds with higher
default rates have lower effective maturity, and this can be reflected in relatively
higher prices (as the payment flows are discounted for shorter time periods) that
determine particularly low yield rates (computed on the bond residual life). Let
us for example assume r = 3%, R = 80 and λ = 10%; under these assumptions we
have cpar = 5, 56% and the following yields:
N c=0% c=3% c=10%
1 5.10% 5.35% 5.89%
5 4.27% 5.01% 6.38%
10 3.41% 4.67% 6.79%
15 2.74% 4.42% 7.06%
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This example shows that the yield rate of a zero-coupon bond (c = 0%) with
long maturity (N = 15) can even be lower than the risk-free rate, in spite of
the high default rate. This happens because with such high default rates the
probability that the face value of the bond is payed-off at maturity is just about
20%. In the remaining 80% of cases the bond will be repayed before maturity
and discounting the payoff for a shorter time period offsets the loss of 20% on the
nominal.5
Finally, let us consider the case in which r = 3% and R = 80:
λ = 1% λ = 5% λ = 10%
N c=15% c=2% c=0%
1 3.31% 4.12% 5.10%
5 3.43% 3.96% 4.27%
10 3.53% 3.77% 3.41%
15 3.60% 3.61% 2.74%
We can observe that the yield for the first two bonds with maturity 15 years
are basically analogous, notwithstanding that the annual default probability of the
second bond is 5 times higher than the annual default probability of the first bond.
Let us also note that the zero-coupon bonds with maturities 10 and 15 years have
yield rates lower than those of the first two bonds for the same maturities, even if
the annual default probabilities for the zero-coupon bonds are much higher.
2.4 Conclusion
The theoretical results achieved in this paper, and the empirical evidence allow us
to infer the following considerations:
• The bond yield rates depend not only on the default probability and the re-
covery rate (and of course the risk-free rate), but also on the bond structural
features as the coupons value and the nominal residual life.
• The bond yields must be cautiously used to deduce information about the
issuers default probability.
• The issuers default probability must be explicitly computed using the bond
structural features and the related prices.
5Let us observe that if the risk-free rate were lower, the gain in terms of expected value
coming from the anticipated repayment could not be sufficient to compensate the loss. For
example, when r = 2%, the yield rate for the bond with maturity 15 years is equal to 2, 24%,
that is higher than the risk-free rate.
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A Appendix (proofs)
Proof of Lemma 2
For N = 1 one has
P1 = c
1− λ
1 + r
+R
λ
1 + r
+ 100
1− λ
1 + r
(A.5)
so that the value of the coupon cpar for which P1 = 100 is equal to
cpar =
100r + (100−R)λ
1− λ . (A.6)
From equation (2.1) one has
P (N) = P (N − 1)
+
(
c
(1− λ)N
(1 + r)N
+R
λ(1− λ)N−1
(1 + r)N
+ 100
(1− λ)N
(1 + r)N
− 100(1− λ)
N−1
(1 + r)N−1
)
.
(A.7)
The value of cpar from equation (A.6) is such that the second term in equation
(A.7) is equal to zero so that, for induction, the price of a bond with arbitrary
maturity and coupons equal to cpar is always equal to 100. 
Proof of Proposition 1
Let us start the proof showing that coupons higher than cpar imply, with all the
other factors being the same, yields higher than the par yield, and viceversa. Let
us first show that, for any bond with coupon c, we have
100 =
N∑
n=1
c
(1 + c/100)n
+
100
(1 + c/100)N
. (A.8)
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In fact we have
N∑
n=1
c
(1 + c/100)n
+
100
(1 + c/100)N
= c
N∑
n=1
(
1
1 + c/100
)n
+
100
(1 + c/100)N
= c
1
1+c/100
−
(
1
1+c/100
)N+1
1− 1
1+c/100
+
100
(1 + c/100)N
= c
100
100+c
(
1−
(
100
100+c
)N)
c 1
100+c
+
100(
100+c
100
)N
= 100− 100
(
100
100 + c
)N
+ 100
(
100
100 + c
)N
= 100.
(A.9)
Let us remark that this is true in particular when c = cpar, in which case we have
100 =
N∑
n=1
cpar
(1 + cpar/100)n
+
100
(1 + cpar/100)N
. (A.10)
Lemma 1 tells us that the yield of any bond with maturity N is equal to the par
yield when the coupons are equal to cpar.
Moreover, from equation (2.1) we have that when a bond has a coupon which
differs from cpar by ∆, the variation of its yield δ is imolicitly defined by
100 +
N∑
n=1
∆
(1− λ)n
(1 + r)n
=
N∑
n=1
cpar + ∆
(1 + cpar/100 + δ)n
+
100
(1 + cpar/100 + δ)N
. (A.11)
If by absurd we assume δ = 0, equation (A.11) would become, using (A.10),
∆
N∑
n=1
(1− λ)n
(1 + r)n
= ∆
N∑
n=1
1
(1 + cpar/100)n
= ∆
N∑
n=1
(
1− λ
1 + r −Rλ/100
)n
(A.12)
where in the last identity we have used the cpar definition in (A.6). We can easily
observe that the last term in equation (A.12) is actually greater (lower) than the
first term when ∆ > 0 (∆ < 0). It follows that δ must be positive (negative) when
∆ is positive (negative) in order to satisfy equation (A.11).
48
Let us now note that the yield increment δ is always lower than δsup =
Rλ/100
1−λ
(i.e., the bond yield has an upper bound, whatever is the coupon value). In fact,
we have on one end, using definition 5, when c = cpar + ∆,
100 +
N∑
n=1
∆
(1− λ)n
(1 + r)n
=
N∑
n=1
cpar
(1− λ)n
(1 + r)n
+
N∑
n=1
Rλ(1− λ)n−1
(1 + r)n
+ 100
(1− λ)N
(1 + r)N
+
N∑
n=1
∆
(1− λ)n
(1 + r)n
≥
N∑
n=1
cpar
(1− λ)n
(1 + r)n
+ 100
(1− λ)N
(1 + r)N
+
N∑
n=1
∆
(1− λ)n
(1 + r)n
,
(A.13)
where the equation is satisfied only for R = 0 or λ = 0; on the other end, when
δ = δsup, equation (A.11) becomes
100 +
N∑
n=1
∆
(1− λ)n
(1 + r)n
=
N∑
n=1
cpar + ∆
(1 + cpar/100 + δsup)n
+
100
(1 + cpar/100 + δsup)N
=
N∑
n=1
cpar + ∆
(1 + cpar/100 +
Rλ
100(1−λ))
n
+
100
(1 + cpar/100 +
Rλ
100(1−λ))
N
=
N∑
n=1
cpar
(1− λ)n
(1 + r)n
+ 100
(1− λ)N
(1 + r)N
N∑
n=1
+∆
(1− λ)n
(1 + r)n
.
(A.14)
It follows that, except in the particular cases R = 0 or λ = 0, in which δ = δsup = 0,
we need δ < δsup in order to satisfy equation (A.11).
To complete the proof let us see what happens to a bond yield when to a first
coupon increment ∆1 > 0 we add a further increment ∆2 > 0.
6 In this case we
must show that the bond yield cpar/100 + δ1 (related to the bond with coupon
cpar + ∆1), increases ofthe positive value δ2 implicitly defined by
100 +
N∑
n=1
∆1
(1− λ)n
(1 + r)n
+
N∑
n=1
∆2
(1− λ)n
(1 + r)n
=
N∑
n=1
cpar + ∆1 + ∆2
(1 + cpar/100 + δ1 + δ2)n
+
100
(1 + cpar/100 + δ1 + δ2)N
.
(A.15)
6The proof for negative variations is analogous.
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As previously, if by absurd we assume δ2 = 0, equation (A.15) would become
∆2
N∑
n=1
(1− λ)n
(1 + r)n
= ∆2
N∑
n=1
1
(1 + cpar/100 + δ1)n
= ∆2
N∑
n=1
(
1− λ
1 + r −Rλ/100 + δ1(1− λ)
)n
.
(A.16)
As δ1 < δsup, we can note that the last term in equation (A.16) is actually greater
than the first. It follows that we need δ2 > 0 to satisfy equation (A.15). 
Proof of Proposition 2
To prove that coupons greater than cpar imply increasing yield curves we must
show that, for a bond with maturity N and coupon cpar + ∆, with ∆ > 0, the δ
implicitly defined by the following equation is positive. 7
100 +
N∑
n=1
∆
(1− λ)n
(1 + r)n
=
N∑
n=1
cpar + ∆
(1 + cpar/100 + δN−1 + δ)n
+
100
(1 + cpar/100 + δN−1 + δ)N
,
(A.17)
where δN−1 is the difference with respect to cpar for a bond with maturity N − 1
and coupon equal to cpar + ∆.
Let us start assuming, by absurd, that δ = 0. We could write equation (A.17) ,
using (A.6), as
∆
(1− λ)N
(1 + r)N
=
cpar + ∆
(1 + cpar/100 + δN−1)N
+
100
(1 + cpar/100 + δN−1)N
− 100
(1 + cpar/100 + δN−1)N−1
= (cpar + ∆)
(
1− λ
1 + r −Rλ/100 + δN−1(1− λ)
)N
− (cpar + 100δN−1)
(
1− λ
1 + r −Rλ/100 + δN−1(1− λ)
)N
= (∆− 100δN−1)
(
1− λ
1 + r −Rλ/100 + δN−1(1− λ)
)N
(A.18)
7In case of decreasing yield curves for ∆ < 0 the proof is similar.
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Let us now observe that ∆ > 100δN−1, as we have, for any bond with maturity
N − 1, coupon equal to cpar + ∆, and related yield cpar100 + δN−1, the following
equation:
100 + ∆
N−1∑
n=1
(1− λ)n
(1 + r)n
=
N−1∑
n=1
cpar + ∆
(1 + cpar/100 + δN−1)n
+
100
(1 + cpar/100 + δN−1)N−1
.
(A.19)
If we had δN−1 = ∆100 this equation wouldn’t be satisfied, being ∆
∑N−1
n=1
(1−λ)n
(1+r)n
> 0
and having, for each bond with maturity N − 1 and coupon cpar+∆, the equation
100 =
N−1∑
n=1
cpar + ∆
(1 + cpar+∆
100
)n
+
100
(1 + cpar+∆
100
)N−1
. (A.20)
So we need δN−1 < ∆100 in order to satisfy equation (A.19).
Let us also remember that δN−1 < δsup = Rλ/(100(1− λ)).
It follows that the last term in equation (A.18) is greater than the first term.
This is an absurd and it thus follows that we need δ > 0 to satisfy the equation
(A.17).
We can complete the proof showing that coupons higher (lower) than the par yield
imply, wirth the other factors being the same, increasing (respectively decreasing)
bond prices curves. In fact, as for c > cpar (c < cpar) the second term in equation
(A.7) is greater (smaller) than zero, we get
100 < P1 < · · · < Pn · · · < PN , se c > cpar (A.21)
100 > P1 > · · · > Pn · · · > PN , se c < cpar. (A.22)
We can ths conclude that when the bond coupons are higher than cpar we get an
increasing price structure, and viceversa. 
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